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I found reading Murray G. Murphey's Philosophical Foundations of 
Historical Knowledge both familiar and strange. It is easy to account for the 
familiarity. I was a graduate student in American Civilization at the University of 
Pennsylvania from 1967 to 1971, a period that was (I think) the most fertile and 
dynamic period for Murray ' s first putting together the elements I see in the PFHK. 
Put differently, the excitement of being his student at the time was seeing him 
come into class every session with some new set of notes around an idea fresh 
from his writing the night before (or so it seemed to this student).1 We were 
witnesses to ideas-in-the-making, and it was dazzling. 
By 1967 Murray had assimilated the anthropology of Penn colleagues A.L 
Hallowell and Anthony Wallace fully into his thinking, and we read Kuhn under 
Murray's tutelage. Quine, Carnap, Peirce, and other philosophers show up in my 
graduate course notes from the period, and we knew that Murray was at work on 
a collaborative (with Elizabeth Flower) history of American philosophy.2 Murray's 
Our Knowledge of the Historical Past3 appeared soon after the end of my graduate 
study, and between the covers of that book lay ideas that I had heard in the 
classroom and in office conferences from 1967 through 1971. Michael Zuckerman 
was my dissertation director, but the considerable things I learned from Zuckerman 
seemed to reinforce what I had learned from Murray.4 
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So I was launched on my own in 1971, carrying Murray's ideas into the 
relatively new American Studies Program at the University of California, Davis. 
I taught Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions5 and Anthony F.C. 
Wallace's Culture and Personality6 to my students at UC Davis, but it was always 
Murphey I was teaching. I taught a methods course for American Studies majors 
and even, for a few years, tried to teach the undergraduates how to "read" (if not 
use) statistics rendered in social science research. In short, I had brought "the 
Penn approach" (in large part, the Murphey approach) into an undergraduate 
program run by three Ph.D.s (Robert Merideth, Brom Weber, and David S. 
Wilson) from the University of Minnesota American Studies program. 
I read Berger and Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality1 right at 
the end of my graduate study, too late to use in my dissertation, but I saw in that 
"treatise in the sociology of knowledge" a useful elaboration of what I had learned 
as the Penn approach. So as the years and then decades passed, I plunged heavily 
into Peter Berger' s sociology, Clfford Geertz' s anthropology, Gregory Bateson' s 
transdisciplinary ideas, and eventually back to William James, whose Pragma-
tism was the book at the center of my first term paper in college. Having used a 
postdoctoral year at the 1975-76 Yale Humanities Institute to read broadly in 
folklore studies, by the mid-1980s I had become interested in the uses of 
neopragmatism as the philosophical foundation for the study of common sense in 
everyday life. I was editor of Western Folklore by then and put together a special 
section of essays on William James and the study of everyday life. I had been 
reading beyond James to the neopragmatists, including Rorty. In Richard Rorty, 
I thought, I had found a statement of neopragmatism that fit well the trajectory 
begun with my graduate study under Murray. 
Imagine my surprise on reading PFHK that Murray and I have landed in two 
different places. 
My first clue came when, even before beginning the book, I checked the 
name index and found no reference to Rorty. In fact, Murray's treatment of 
Hay den White's arguments about the relation between narratives and history 
suggests a rejection of the postmodern, postrationalist position that I thought was 
the logical conclusion to the journey I had begun with Murray in 1967. Was this 
the same Murphey who had written "On the Relation Between Science and 
Religion" for the American Quarterly in 1971? 
But I jump ahead here in my account of the combined familiarity and 
strangeness I experienced reading PFHK. I found I could agree easily with all 
eight premises Murray lays out in his introduction (x), and my allegiance to 
pragmatism stirred when I understood that Murray's main antagonist in this book 
is Quine, with Quine' s failure lying in his inability to resolve the tensions between 
the two traditions—pragmatic naturalism and Logical Empiricism—he inherits 
(xii). Still, in the introduction, Murray signals that he believes Quine is correct in 
his pragmatic epistemology but errs in his adherence to a Logical Empiricism that 
leads to the faulty thesis of the Indeterminacy of Translation. The antidote, 
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Murray hints early, is to keep the pragmatic naturalism (of Peirce, James, and 
Dewey) and to see "science as a process of inquiry." 
Now, I can skip over the chapters on "Meaning and Reference," on "Other 
Minds and Intersubjective Knowledge," on "Causation and Explanation," on 
"Action," and on "Rules," as much of this material is familiar from his past work 
and I agree with Murray in large part. My one quibble would be with Murray's 
reliance on so many laboratory-based studies of children's cognitive develop-
ment and acquisition of language skills. As I have come to work more on 
children's folk cultures in natural settings, I have come to be increasingly 
suspicious of the validity of studies based in laboratory rather than natural 
settings. But what Murray draws from these studies are the sorts of principles that 
seem to stand up across several sorts of research settings, so I can put aside my 
suspicions and grant that there are universal processes of cognitive development 
grounded in our biology. Indeed, the more I did fieldwork with male adolescents 
at a Boy Scout camp and the more I have examined male adolescent cultures 
across time and space, the more I am willing to temper my strict social-
constructionist views and to make room for the power of developmental pro-
cesses beyond the effects of culture (though culture may shape the behavioral 
outcomes of the processes). Hormones have their reasons. 
Besides, Murray takes us through these studies toward substantiating the first 
premise that "There is a real world of which true knowledge is possible," a 
premise I accept. Berger and Lucklmann begin at somewhat the same place. "It 
will be enough for our purposes," they write in their Introduction to SCR, ""to 
define 'reality" as a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as 
having a being independent of our own volition (we cannot 'wish them away'), 
and to define 'knowledge' as the certainty that phenomena are real and that they 
possess specific characteristics" (1). The meaning of Murray's phrase, "true 
knowledge," must await chapter 6's discussion of "Truth and Reality." 
Chapter 3, on "Causation and Explanation," did begin to raise some suspi-
cions I held, as Murray nowhere in that chapter acknowledges that explanations 
need to be persuasive to a community to whom the explanation is offered, a point 
I thought was central in Kuhn, and Murray's critique of Wittgenstein in Ch. 5, on 
"Rules," made me begin to worry that Murray was not going to follow the path 
to the postmodern condition. 
It is in chapter 6 on "Truth and Reality" that I became most alarmed about 
the absence of Rorty from Murray's discussion. I thought I could be comfortable 
with Murray's brand of realism—in this case, that "True knowledge of the real 
world is possible even though complete knowledge of it is not" (213)—so long 
as we are talking about a pragmatic understanding of "true." Indeed, Murray 
defines "confirmation" as 
a process of testing a theory against alternative theories, and 
that theory is the better confirmed that makes all the known 
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evidence more probable than do any of its rivals. The best 
theory may be defined, then, as that theory that always beats all 
challengers.... Of course, we could never know that a given 
theory was the best theory, since further tests would always be 
possible in the future. If we could know that our present theory 
was the best, we could have certain knowledge and certainty is 
what we shall never have. (232) 
This seems fine to me, though I have to assume that Murray agrees that "beats all 
challengers" means that a theory looks "best" to a specific community that is the 
audience for the claim. And Kuhn tells us to look at all the criteria and interests 
an audience might invoke in preferring one theory over another. 
Still on the crucial issue of confirmation, which Murray takes up again in the 
all-important chapter 7, "Knowledge of the Past," he poses the key question for 
readers in American Studies—namely, whether history is like the sciences in 
terms of confirmation. Acknowledging how history is not like the social sciences, 
Murray still holds out for a sort of confirmation. "The best we seem able to do 
at present," he writes, "is to develop theories that integrate as much of the existing 
data as possible" (300). 
Now, this is a Kuhnian solution and is quite consistent with another 
formulation I like, this time from Clifford Geertz, who argues that interpretive 
anthropology is "scientific" in the same sense that we would feel comfortable 
calling clinical inference "scientific." It is worth quoting Geertz in full on this 
matter: 
To generalize within cases is usually called, at least in 
medicine and depth psychology, clinical inference. Rather 
than beginning with a set of observations and attempting to 
subsume them under a governing law, such inferences begin 
with a set of (presumptive) signifiers and attempt to place them 
within an intelligible frame. Measures are matched to theoreti-
cal predictions, but symptoms (even when they are measured) 
are scanned for theoretical peculiarities—that is, they are 
diagnosed. In the study of culture the signifiers are not 
symptoms or clusters of symptoms, but symbolic acts or 
clusters of symbolic acts, and the aim is not therapy but the 
analysis of social discourse. But the way in which theory is 
used—to ferret out the unapparent import of things—is the 
same.8 
Put differently, the anthropologist or historian uses a method resembling 
clinical inference in that the culture critic creates a narrative that makes "best 
sense" of the array of seemingly unconnected symptoms or symbolic acts. 
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Now, there are at least two interesting features of this formulation, both of 
which seem (to me) to be compatible with Murray's approach (but also showing 
Murray's gap). First, clinical inference in medical diagnostics has a "reality test" 
of the sort Murray says is at work in the sciences. That is, hypotheses in clinical 
inference may have "power and adequacy" to the extent that a patient might 
actually improve after a given therapeutic intervention, though we never know for 
sure whether the intervention was the single variable changing. In any case, in 
medicine we might judge one explanation better than another to the degree that 
the patient improves with one treatment and not with another. 
But, as Geertz says, neither the anthropologist nor, by implication, the 
historian has the same "reality test" available. In place of nature, Geertz offers the 
"intelligibility" of the narrative as the criterion forjudging one explanation better 
than another. The question in this passage, of course, is "a frame intelligible to 
whom?" As in Kuhn's formulation, Geertz assumes that there is an interpretive 
community with criteria (some explicit, some implicit) forjudging one narrative 
explanation superior to another. And those criteria, William James would 
suggest, amount to the community's criteria for judging the "truth" of an 
explanation. So Geertz offers a formulation of culture and of the interpretive 
method quite consistent with Kuhn and, I would argue, with Murray.9 So why 
does Geertz play no role in PFHK1 
Murray does articulate a criterion for comparing explanations, one that Kuhn 
and Geertz would embrace easily enough. If the better explanation is one that 
integrates "as much of the existing data as possible" (300), then, reasons Murray, 
"it is important to combine types of data which have different and offsetting 
biases.... A theory that can integrate a wide range of data types therefore has a 
better claim than one that is based on only one type of data" (300-301). 
Sometimes the data types must include inferred data, as a solution to the problem 
of missing data is the creation of inferred data from existing data (301-302). 
This faith in the diversity of data types underlies, no doubt, Murray's 
confidence that historians will find a way to sort out the contradictory claims of 
Jack P. Greene's Pursuits of Happiness10 and David Hackett Fischer's Albion's 
Seed .n "It should be emphasized that there are major differences in the theories 
proposed," writes Murray, "and that they are differences that can—and will—be 
settled by empirical research. These are not matters of the scholars's values 
somehow distorting their vision, of 'prejudice' or 'alternative and incommensu-
rable interpretations.' They are matters of evidence and of testing contradictory 
theories against that evidence" (287). I doubt it. 
Everything I have learned in thirty years of reading and writing culture 
criticism, including what I learned from Murray, makes me believe that every7 
rhetorical act, every claim (including the one I'm making now) embodies the 
rhetor's interests. I have no faith that persuasion about a "best theory" rests only 
on "evidence." I have made " the linguistic turn," I have abandoned "the 
Enlightenment project" and moved to post-structuralist and other post-rationalist 
critical positions, which Murphey has not. And I still cannot account for that. 
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Note 
1. I still have my notes from his graduate courses, including the typescript notes he 
used in teaching quantitative reasoning to the first year grad students. 
2. Elizabeth Flower and Murray G. Murphey, A History of Philosophy in America 
(New York, 1977), 2 vols. 
3. Indianapolis, 1973. 
4. In retrospect, I know that I did not appreciate then what differences there were 
between Murray's and Mike's evolving ideas, though it was complicated by Mike's having 
been Murray's student as an undergraduate at Penn. Since then I've come to understand better 
the distinctive, powerful nature of Mike's ideas and approaches. 
5. 2nd éd.; Chicago, 1970. Orig. 1962. 
6. 2nd éd.; New York, 1970. Orig. 1961. 
7. Garden City, NY, 1966. 
8. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, 1973), 26. Emphasis 
added. 
9. Geertz's notion of "culture" as "best seen not as complexes of concrete behavior 
patterns—customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters—. . . but as a set of control mecha-
nisms—plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what computer engineers call 'programs')—for the 
governing of behavior" {Interpretation, 44) should suit Murphey. As I was revising this 
essay for publication, Clifford Geertz chimed in again with a review, entitled "Culture War," 
of two books—Gananath Obeyesekere's The Apotheosis of Captain Cook: European 
Mythmaking in the Pacific and Marshall Sahlins's How "Natives" Think, About Captain 
Cook, for Example—that take the same "evidence" and draw very different "truths" about the 
meanings of Captain Cook to the Hawaiians. Geertz's review, among other things, is an 
exercise in expressing the criteria that make one explanation more "persuasive" than another 
to one anthropologist, the reviewer. See The New York Review of Books, Nov. 30, 1995, 4-
6. 
10. Chapel Hill, 1988. 
11. New York, 1989. 
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